We consider full implementation in general environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.
Introduction
Since the celebrated work of Maskin (1999 Maskin ( , circulated in 1977 , economists have been interested in understanding what social objectives can be achieved in decentralized economies.
More precisely, the question is what social choice functions (hereafter, SCFs) can be implemented as outcomes of a suitably-constructed mechanism or game form when agents know some "state of the world" that a social planner does not.
1 Maskin (1999) focussed on outcomes that obtain in Nash equilibria and found that only SCFs that satisfy a fairly demanding property, (Maskin-)monotonicity, are implementable. Moreover, sufficiency of this property -along with some other mild conditions -has only been established in general environments using so-called "integer games" or "tail-chasing mechanisms", which are unappealing for well-known reasons (see, for example, Jackson, 1992) .
For both the above reasons, a sizable literature has examined implementation in other solution concepts, often refinements of Nash equilibria. Perhaps most prominently, the scope for implementation expands substantially when one considers either subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (Abreu and Sen, 1990; Moore and Repullo, 1988) or undominated Nash equilibria (Palfrey and Srivastava, 1991; Jackson et al., 1994) ; furthermore, the mechanisms used in some of these papers are insulated from the critiques levied against the mechanisms used for Nash implementation.
However, it is now increasingly recognized that these implementations of non-monotonic SCFs are also problematic because they are not robust to even slight departures from underlying common knowledge assumptions (Chung and Ely, 2003; Aghion et al., 2012 ). An alternative approach that also yields permissive results is that of virtual or approximate implementation (Matsushima, 1988; Abreu and Sen, 1991; Abreu and Matsushima, 1992b) .
As is well-known, however, a weakness of this approach is that mechanisms must randomize over outcomes and the resulting outcome may be very inefficient, unfair, or "far" from the desired outcome, even if this only occurs with small ex-ante probability.
2 Furthermore, many of these results become much less permissive when the implementation problem concerns only two players, a case that is important due to its relevance for bilateral contracting.
More recently, a burgeoning literature studies the scope for implementation when players have preferences for honesty. Loosely, a (small) preference for honesty means that a player has an intrinsic preference for "truthful" messages/reports when his message does not change the outcome of the mechanism.
3 Intuitively, what now determines implementability is preferences over the joint space of messages and outcomes. Kartik and Tercieux (2012) 2 Moreover, Matsushima (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1991) also use integer games. Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) achieve implementation in iterative deletion of (strictly) dominated strategies with finite mechanisms (in a very broad class of finite environments), but rely quite critically on the linearity assumption of expected utility. Furthermore, they use potentially-long chains of iterative dominance reasoning, which has been criticized by, for example, Glazer and Rosenthal (1992) ; see Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) for a response and Sefton and Yavas (1996) for experimental evidence bearing on the debate. Abreu and Matsushima (1994) use similar ideas as Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) to obtain exact implementation in iterative deletion of weakly-dominated strategies under certain conditions.
3 In this paper, we focus on settings where preferences for honesty are small in the sense that they only play a role when players are indifferent (or nearly indifferent) over outcomes. Of course, in some applications, it may also be reasonable that players have large preferences for honesty.
observe that preferences for honesty render any SCF monotonic on this extended space.
This suggests that even Nash implementation may be quite permissive when players have preferences for honesty. However, existing results suffer from at least one of the weaknesses mentioned above. For example, Dutta and Sen (2011) and Kartik and Tercieux (2012) use integer games, 4 Matsushima (2008a) uses mechanisms that randomize over outcomes and only studies settings with three or more players, while Matsushima (2008c) also uses randomization and further assumes stronger conditions on the nature of preferences for honesty.
5
In this paper, we also study implementation when players have a preference for honesty.
Our contribution is to derive a strong positive result for a general class of environments of economic interest. Specifically, we show that so long as there are two or more players and the environment satisfies a condition called separable punishment, any SCF is implementable in two rounds of iterative deletion of (strictly) dominated strategies by a well-behaved mechanism. Roughly speaking, the separable-punishment condition requires that one can find a player with a preference for honesty, say j, and another player, say i, such that for any outcome in the range of the SCF, there is an alternative outcome under which, in any state, j is indifferent between the two outcomes while i strictly prefers the socially-desired outcome to the alternative. In this sense, it is possible to suitably "punish" one player without punishing the other.
While we defer until later a detailed discussion of the result, a few brief comments are worth noting here. First, what makes the separable-punishments condition restrictive -yet powerful -is that the alternative allocation referred to above must be state-independent.
We give examples of economic problems in which this condition is naturally satisfied; in particular, it holds both in a standard exchange economy and also in any problem when the mechanism has the ability to augment large-enough monetary punishments on players, which has been a setting of quite some interest in the incomplete contracts literature as discussed in Section 4. Second, implementation in two rounds of iterative deletion of dom-4 See also Ben-Porath and Lipman (2011) and Lombardi and Yoshihara (2011) . 5 Both Matsushima (2008a) and Matsushima (2008c) achieve implementation in iterated deletion of dominated strategies following the approach of Matsushima (1992b, 1994) . A virtue of these papers is that the planner only needs to be able to impose small fines on players. Note that Matsushima (2008a) studies settings with complete information, as does the current paper and most of the literature cited earlier, while Matsushima (2008c) tackles settings with incomplete information relying on the expected utility hypothesis.
inated strategies is an appealing solution concept. Since it is weaker than rationalizability, it is a robust solution concept (unlike refinements of Nash, as noted earlier); moreover, the fact that only two rounds of deletion are required also means that players only need only mutual knowledge -rather than common knowledge -that dominated strategies will not be played (cf. Matsushima, 2008b) . Third, the mechanism is extremely simple, and is essentially a direct mechanism. Moreover, if, for example, all players have a preference for honesty and large monetary punishments are available, implementation is "detail free" in the sense of not depending on fine details of the environment. Finally, we emphasize that the result applies to settings with only two players; not only is this inherently important, but inter alia also disproves a conjecture by Dutta and Sen (2011) that we discuss in Section 4.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple example to highlight the main idea. The general setting and result follows in Section 3. In Section 4
we discuss various aspects of the result, including more detailed connections to both the general implementation and incomplete contracts literatures.
An Example
Consider a setting with two players, 1 and 2, and two states, θ and θ . The socially desired outcomes at state θ and θ are respectively denoted by f (θ ) and f (θ ). The mechanism designer can augment outcomes with transfers (that he is only willing to use off the equilibrium path). Agents' preferences are quasi-linear and state independent: i's utility at state θ ∈ {θ , θ } given outcome a and transfer t i is represented by v i (a) − t i .
Because preferences are state-independent and the goal is full implementation, f is not implementable in virtually any solution concept unless f (θ ) = f (θ ).
We will study the following direct mechanism where each player announces a value of the state. The outcome selected by the mechanism only depends on player 1's announcement: if player 1 claims the state is θ then the outcome selected is f (θ). In this sense, player 1 is a dictator over outcomes. In terms of transfers, if players disagree on their announcements, then only player 1 is fined an amount t 1 ; if players agree, there is no transfer to either player. Now we introduce the notion that player 2 has a preference for honesty by supposing that his payoff increases by ε > 0 when making an "honest" announcement. Formally, if the true state is θ ∈ {θ , θ }, the payoff matrix in the game induced by the mechanism is now as follows, where we denote the possible announcements for each player by θ and ¬θ: It is clear that in this game, player 2 has a strictly dominant strategy to announce the truth, θ. Furthermore, provided the fine t 1 is large enough, it is then iteratively strictly dominant for player 1 to also announce θ. Consequently, in either state, both players telling the truth is the unique profile of strategies surviving two rounds of iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies.
Notice that we only needed to assume that one player (viz., player 2) has the preference for honesty, but the mechanism exploits the identity of this player. If, however, both players have a preference for honesty -which we view as reasonable -then the mechanism is in fact "detail free" in the sense that the planner can choose either player to act as "dictator"
and does not need to know much about players' preferences: all that he needs to do is impose a sufficiently large fine on the dictator when announcements do not coincide. Of course, there is a minimal requirement that the planner must know what amount of fine will be large enough.
This simple example illustrates our main result below. By constructing a mechanism wherein one player is indifferent between all strategies in terms of her material payoff, a small preference for honesty can be exploited to ensure that it is a dominant strategy for her to tell the truth. The mechanism must then ensure that the unique best response for the other player is to also tell the truth. We identify a property called separable punishment that permits such a construction.
The Result
There is a set of states Θ, a set of outcomes or allocations A, and a finite set of players I = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2. A social choice function (SCF) is a mapping f : Θ → A.
Given any function α whose domain is Θ, let α(Θ) := θ∈Θ α(θ). The primitives specify preferences over A in each state θ for each player j, captured by a linear order 
then
The key idea here is that because of the antecedent (1), the condition only has bite on preferences over the subset of A × M among which j is "materially indifferent" over the allocations; in this sense, it captures small or even lexicographic considerations. The It is worth highlighting that a player's preference for honesty is defined with respect to a particular space of message profiles; in particular, Definition 1 does not require player j's message space to coincide with the set of states (although its cardinality must be at least as large).
6 To see why this may be substantively relevant, suppose each state is a profile of preferences over allocations. Then, if player j were asked to report the state (i.e. M j = Θ) he may not have a strict preference for truth-telling because he is reporting other players' allocation-preferences too; but if he is asked to only report his own allocation-preferences (i.e. that component of the state), then his preference for truth-telling may have bite. So long as player j's allocation-preferences are distinct in every state, this setting would satisfy Definition 1.
We next introduce a domain restriction that will play a central role in our main result.
Definition 2. There is separable punishment if there is a function x : f (Θ) → A and players i and j = i such that for all a ∈ f (Θ) and for all θ ∈ Θ:
In words, separable punishment says that for any a in the range of the SCF there is some other allocation x(a) such that in every state, player j is indifferent between a and x(a) while player i finds x(a) worse than the socially desired allocation at that state. It is worth stressing that the alternative allocation, x(a), cannot depend on the state. Separable punishment differs from various "bad/worst outcome" conditions in the literature (e.g. Moore and Repullo, 1990; Jackson et al., 1994) in two ways: first, it requires that the alternative allocation must keep player j indifferent rather than making him worse off; second, it does not require that the alternative allocation must be "bad" for player i uniformly over states and allocations in the range of the SCF. Generally, separable punishment is more likely to hold when there are transferable private goods, and indeed, there are natural and well-studied economic environments that satisfy separable punishment. We provide two examples.
Consider first an economy with transfers and quasi-linear preferences. Here the outcome space A = B × R n consists of pairs (b, t) where b is some fundamental allocation and t = (t i ) i∈I is a vector of transfers. For each player i and state θ, preferences A i,θ over outcomes (b, t) are represented by v i (b, θ) − t i . Further assume that for some player i, the function v i (·, ·) is bounded uniformly over b and θ, i.e., there is a constant C ∈ R + satisfying |v i (b, θ)| ≤ C for all b and θ. One can now easily check that the requirement of separable punishment is satisfied with the function x(·) defined by x(b, t) = (b, t ) where t i is chosen 6 Furthermore, the definition also allows j's preferences to depend on the messages sent by other players beyond how these affect allocations.
sufficiently large while t j = t j for all j = i. Note that this subsumes prominent settings in the literature such as Moore and Repullo (1988, Section 5) .
Second, consider an exchange economy with ≥ 2 commodities. There is an aggregate endowment vector ω ∈ R ++ . An outcome a is an allocation (a 1 , ..., a n ) ∈ R n such that a i ≥ 0 and i∈I a i ≤ ω . 7 For each player i and state θ, preferences A i,θ over outcomes are assumed to be strictly increasing in i's component, i.e., a i > a i =⇒ a A i,θ a . Assuming that at each state, the social choice function allocates each player i a strictly positive amount of some commodity, it is easily verified that separable punishment is satisfied with the function x(·) defined by x(a) = a where a i = 0 while a j = a j for all j = i.
We are now in a position to state the main result. Theorem 1. Assume separable punishment and fix i and j from that definition. Suppose further there is a message space (M i , M j ) such that (i) there is some injective function h i : Θ → M i , and (ii) player j has a preference for honesty on (M i , M j ). Then the SCF f can be implemented in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.
Proof. Fix i, j and M i , M j from the theorem's hypotheses. Pick an arbitrary θ * ∈ Θ and define the mechanism ((M i , M j ), g) where
Consider any state θ. For any given m i , j is indifferent over all the outcomes he can induce, so condition (1) is satisfied. Hence, j's preference for honesty implies (2) and it is strictly dominant for j to send message m * j (θ). Now fix m j = m * j (θ). It follows from the definition of g(·) that if player i reports
The definition of g(·) combined with the injective property of both m * j (·) and h i (·) further implies that if player i sends any m i = h i (θ), he will induce either x(f (θ)) or x(f (θ * )). The separable punishment condition implies that both of these are strictly less preferred for i in state θ than f (θ). It follows that the unique best response for player i is to send message h i (θ).
Therefore, the unique strategy profile surviving two rounds of iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies is m j = m * j (θ) and m i = h i (θ), which yields the outcome f (θ), as desired.
Discussion
The essence of the logic behind Theorem 1 is similar to that presented in the example of Section 2. Indeed, if we were to assume that each M i is the set of states of the world, we could just let h i (·) in the proof of Theorem 1 be the identity mapping. In addition, if we (naturally) assume that the function m * j (·) is the identity mapping, the mechanism in the proof simplifies to the following: if both players claim the state is θ, choose outcome f (θ); otherwise, choose x(f (θ i )) where θ i is the state announced by player i. By the separable punishment condition, player j is indifferent between all his messages. So it is uniquely optimal for player j to tell the truth; in turn, separable punishment further implies that the unique best response for player i is to also tell the truth. Plainly, this mechanism is an extremely simple direct mechanism: there is only one round of messages and obviously no use of integer games or related ideas. Dutta and Sen (2011) provide a separability condition under which they establish that any social choice function can be implemented by a mechanism that does not use integer games so long as there are three or more players. Their condition is logically incomparable with our separable punishment condition. However, separability conditions in the literature generally incorporate settings such as public-good environments with transfers and quasilinear preferences, 8 but Dutta and Sen's notion excludes this standard environment (as they note) while ours does not. This is one reason our result applies to a class of economic problems that Theorem 4 in Dutta and Sen (2011) does not. Furthermore, our result applies when there are only two players, which is important for various applications. In fact, Dutta and Sen (2011, page 166 ) discuss whether a strengthening of their separability condition would be sufficient for implementation with a small preference for honesty when there are only two players. They conjecture that the answer to this question must be negative. Our Theorem 1 disproves their conjecture because their suggested strengthening is stronger than our separable punishment condition.
9
While we have focussed on a setting with complete information, our conclusions are not knife-edged because Theorem 1 delivers implementation in rationalizable strategies (requiring only two rounds of iterative deletion of dominated strategies). Given a complete information game, Dekel et al. (2006) show that all rationalizable actions in any nearby game derived by small perturbations to lower-order beliefs and arbitrary perturbations to higherorder beliefs must in fact be rationalizable actions in the original complete-information game.
10 Thus, our result would hold in any such "nearby game". 11 In particular, our result would continue to hold if agents have slight uncertainty about either their own or others' payoffs from outcomes, or about whether others have a preference for honesty. Such robustness contrasts with many implementation results that rely rather heavily on higher-order beliefs (see Oury and Tercieux, 2012) .
We end by noting that our result has some relevance for a debate on foundations of incomplete contracting. Theories of incomplete contracts (e.g. the Property Rights Theory of Grossman and Hart, 1986 ) that rely on information being observable to the contracting parties but not verifiable to a third party (such as a court of law) suffer from a "message game critique". Maskin and Tirole (1999) , for example, show how one can effectively make information verifiable in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of a suitable mechanism following Moore and Repullo (1988) , at least if renegotiation can be eliminated and some other conditions are satisfied. 12 This critique has been called into question by Aghion 9 Dutta and Sen (2011) call an environment separable if there exists an alternative w ∈ A with the following property: for all a ∈ A and J ⊆ N , there exists a J ∈ A such that for any θ, a J ∼ A θ,j w for all j ∈ J and a J ∼ A θ,i a for all i / ∈ J. The strengthening they propose for the two-player case consists in assuming that w is the "worst" outcome relative to outcomes in the range of the SCF, i.e., w ≺ A θ,i f (θ) for each player i and state θ. It is easily checked that this would imply our separability condition with the function x(·) defined as x(a) = a {i} . 10 More precisely: the correspondence of interim-correlated rationalizable strategies is upper hemicontinuous in the product topology in the universal type space.
11 In fact, given that the k th round of elimination of the rationalizability process only depends on the k th first order beliefs (Dekel et al., 2007) , it can be shown that our result would continue to hold so long as the perturbation are small for only first and second order beliefs; they can be arbitrary for third and higher order beliefs.
12 The issue of renegotiation is, of course, important but is itself debated in the literature from various et al. (2012) who show that the conclusion is not robust to an arbitrarily small weakening of common knowledge between the contracting parties.
13 By contrast, the result of the current paper does not suffer this weakness because of the robustness properties discussed above. In this sense, in contracting environments when separable punishment is available, small preferences for honesty resuccitates the "message game critique" of just using non-verifiable but observable information as a foundation for incomplete contracts. We emphasize two caveats: first, while separable punishment holds in some contracting environments of interest (e.g. Maskin and Tirole, 1999 , Section 4), the condition is not implied by joint punishments such as a no-trade outcome, for reasons discussed immediately after Definition 2. Second, Aghion et al. (2012, Section 5) point out that introducing significant amount of asymmetric information at the ex-post stage can provide a justification for the Property Rights Theory when players have standard preferences. We conjecture that this remains true even with small preferences for honesty; investigating this further represents a promising avenue for future research.
